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ABSTRACT 
The Determinants of Municipal Minimum Wage Ordinances: 
An Analysis of 100 Large Cities from 2012-2017 
by 
Nicholas S. Hilton, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2019 
Major Professor: Dr. Peter McNamara 
Department: Political Science 
 The city of Seattle, Washington made headlines in 2014 when its city 
council enacted the highest minimum wage in the history of the United States. 
The ruling appeared to begin a trend as similar policies began diffusing in cities 
across the country. In reality, however, municipal minimum wage ordinances have 
existed since the early 1990’s. Yet, despite over two decade’s worth of data on the 
subject, little research has been conducted to understand the characteristics that 
influence cities to enact minimum wages in the first place. This study contributes 
to our understanding of the predictors of minimum wage ordinances by retesting 
prior variables of significance over a more recent time period, while also 
introducing a new set of variables to the literature. I find that cities with an 
increased percentage of residents with bachelor’s degrees face an increased 
likelihood for future policy adoption. Additionally, I find that some age 
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demographics may be significant predictors in future studies of minimum wage.  
(60 pages)  
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INTRODUCTION 
The city of Seattle, Washington made headlines in 2014 when it 
implemented one of the highest minimum wage increases in US history (Cohen, 
2014). The ruling requires that all businesses pay employees no less than $15 per 
hour by 2021 (Wallace, 2014). The act sparked national conversation and appeared 
to start a movement as 24 other U.S. cities followed suit and considered similar 
proposals, 18 of which voted in favor of adoption as of April 2016 (National 
Employment Law Project, 2016). Further research, however, shows that the 
adoption of municipal wage ordinances began long before Seattle, yet little is 
known as to why some cities embrace these policies and others do not (Clain, 
2012). 
This research examines city characteristics that may increase the odds that 
cities enact minimum wage legislation. Most municipal-level studies focus on the 
effects of policy changes, but few studies have examined the factors that actually 
influence policy implementation in the first place (Clain, 2012; Martin, 2006). This 
study contributes to our understanding of municipal minimum wage ordinances 
by testing the influence young populations have on the odds of ordinance 
enactment. I theorize that cities with larger youth populations face increased odds 
of enacting wage increases, based on findings in the crisis of democracy literature 
that have yet to be introduced to studies on minimum wage. First, I survey the 
literature to develop my theory and identify prominent variables. I then explain
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my assumptions and test my predictions using a series of logistic and linear 
regression models, as well as a classification tree. 
A NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR INCREASED WAGES 
The development of city wage ordinances is a relatively new political 
phenomenon that is rapidly diffusing across the United States. Baltimore, 
Maryland was the first to enact what was termed a “living wage” in 1994, and 
within 12 years, over 100 U.S. cities had followed suit (Bernstein, 2004; Martin, 
2006). This new term gave birth to the living wage movement, and characterized 
municipal policies that differ significantly from state and federal wage laws. Rather 
than simply establishing a price floor for all workers in a geographic region, living 
wage ordinances focus only on a select set of workers. 
The development of limited wage intervention calmed the fears of 
minimum wage critics and ensured the longevity of the living wage movement, 
which continues through the time of this study with no signs of stopping 
(Bernstein, 2004; Clain, 2012; Swarts & Vasi, 2011). While a small number of states 
do prohibit cities from enacting wage ordinances at all, most have the discretion to 
make the policy’s coverage as broad or narrow as they see fit (Bergal, 2015; Clain, 
2012). It is easy, therefore, to see why academics studying living wage ordinances 
agree that “no two are the same” (Bernstein, 2004, p. 100). Some living wage 
ordinances may only apply to part-time employees, some may apply to full-time 
employees, while others may apply only to employees in specific industries. 
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Additionally, coalition groups within each city lobby for various exemptions from 
these laws, which lead to further variation (Bernstein, 2004, pp. 100-114). That 
being said, however, the coverage of most municipal living wage policies is fairly 
narrow and they are usually similar in one of three ways. An ordinance may apply 
only to companies that contract with the city, on businesses receiving city 
assistance, or they may apply only to employees of the city itself (Adams & 
Neumark, 2004, p. 211; Bernstein, 2004, pp. 100-111). 
The success of the living wage movement has had a variety of political 
implications, one of which is the development of more all-encompassing wage 
ordinances. In fact, the movement’s growth and success with living wage 
ordinances has contributed to an expansion of policy coverage, as is seen by the 
increasing number of cities enacting full-scale minimum wage ordinances 
(Bernstein, 2004; Reich, Jacobs, & Bernhardt, 2014). These full-scale ordinances, 
referred to as minimum wage ordinances, apply to all businesses within city limits 
(Craigie, 2015). Following the successful spread of living wage ordinances, an 
increasing number of cities began expanding their policies and altered them to 
cover all businesses and employees within the geographical bounds of the city. 
This trend started in 2003 with Santa Fe, New Mexico and then ratcheted up 
significantly after nationwide strikes occurred in 2012 and 2013 when fast-food 
workers walked off the job in protest of low wages. A variety of online platforms 
surfaced at this time, encouraging grassroots activism online in favor of $15 
minimum wages at all levels of government, although the organizations lacked a 
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brick and mortar presence as is normally observed with interest groups (Bernstein, 
2004; National Employment Law Project, 2016). As such, the influence of these 
networking cites will not be present in this analysis because they do not represent 
any one cohesive group, but rather represent a national presence of hashtags and 
Facebook posts. All in all, the living wage movement has evolved to include both 
living wages and city-wide minimum wage ordinances, which are typically 
analyzed separately in the literature. For the purpose of this study, I analyze the 
predictors of the city-wide minimum wage ordinances which are increasingly 
growing in popularity. 
THE DETERMINANTS OF MUNICIPAL WAGE ORDINANCES 
The spike in the number of cities enacting living wage ordinances since 
1994 prompted a number of academic studies. To date, most of these have sought 
to understand the effects of such legislation, however, their disparate findings have 
resulted in an overall lack of consensus (Adams & Neumark, 2004; Bartik, 2004; 
Fairris, 2004; Martin, 2006). An overview of the literature on the aftereffects of any 
wage policy quickly leaves readers feeling confused, and reveals that no 
overarching claim can be made without being negated by a number of other 
studies (Adams & Neumark, 2004). As a result, many academics continue studying 
the issue while very few consider why cities actually enact any type of wage 
ordinance in the first place. 
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Only a handful of quantitative studies have been completed to understand 
the determinants of living wage enactment at the municipal level (Clain, 2012; 
Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2001, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011). Additionally, 
due to the even newer emergence of city-wide minimum wage ordinances, an even 
lesser number of studies have analyzed the predictors of these policies (Doussard 
& Gamal, 2015), one of which applied the same methodology to the state-wide 
wage hikes that began growing following the 2012 and 2013 fast food worker strikes 
(Whitaker, Herian, Larimer, & Lang, 2012). It is important to note, however, that 
although these two bodies 
of research analyze different types of wage laws, they each analyze the influence of 
the same set of predictors. 
These studies all agree that political ideology is a significant predictor of 
wage ordinances and suggest that cities with higher numbers of democrats are 
increasingly more likely to enact these policies. Due to these findings, this study 
measures the political ideology of each city using data from a study by 
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013). Additionally, the determinants research 
presents a variety of significant predicting variables that fall into two camps: 
variables dealing with the economic conditions of a city, and variables that 
measure the presence of interest groups (Clain, 2012; Doussard & Gamal, 2015; 
Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2001, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Whitaker et 
al., 2012). 
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Economic Conditions 
The economic characteristics of a city have been the most significant 
variables of interest in determinants research, although for different reasons 
(Clain, 2012; Levin-Waldman, 2004; Martin, 2006). According to one of the most 
recent studies on living wage ordinances, these are most likely to occur following 
positive economic conditions as determined by measures of income, 
unemployment, and the incidence of poverty (Clain, 2012). This finding, however, 
is disputed by prior determinants research, as well as the research on city-wide 
ordinances that followed, which find that minimum wage 
ordinances are most likely to be enacted following periods of economic hardship 
(Card & Krueger, 1994; Doussard & Gamal, 2015; Levin-Waldman, 2004; Martin, 
2001, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Whitaker et al., 2012).  
Suzzane Clain, from the Economics department at Villanova University, 
conducted the most recent study on the determinants of municipal living wage 
legislation. Clain (2012) theorized that municipal minimum wage ordinances are 
more likely to occur following periods of economic well-being because citizens 
know they can afford it. While there is no conclusive evidence that minimum wage 
ordinances are accompanied by significant costs, some cities have certainly 
experienced negative economic consequences following policy adoption (Adams & 
Neumark, 2004). According to Clain’s (2012) theory, citizens are aware of these 
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potential costs and weigh them against any potential benefits prior to taking a 
policy stance.  
While Clain’s theory and subsequent findings present an ideal form of 
engaged citizenry, they are disputed by all other determinants research. All other 
studies on the issue provide empirical evidence that economic hardship is the 
actual influencing factor spurring policy adoption (Card & Krueger, 1994; Doussard 
& Gamal, 2015; Levin-Waldman, 2004; Martin, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Whitaker 
et al., 2012). In an analysis of 60 cities, Levin-Waldman (2004) observed that cities 
with high levels of minority populations and low levels of educational attainment 
faced an increased predisposition to adopt living wage policies; findings which 
were further compounded by rising income inequality. Later research confirmed 
Levin-Waldman’s (2004) observation and found that cities with lower average 
incomes, increased unemployment, and higher incidents of poverty are more likely 
to enact living wage ordinances (Levin-Waldman, 2008; Martin, 2006). 
Clain’s theory of mindful and beneficent citizens is also disputed by public 
choice theory, which suggests that human beings are rationally self-interested, 
rather than solely altruistic, and that they maximize their benefits while 
minimizing their costs (Shughart, 2008; Simmons, 2011). If this is the case, then the 
supporters of wage ordinances are likely to be those who stand to personally gain 
from the policies. This would be those covered by either living wage ordinances or 
city-wide ordinances, rather than those who are either (a) not covered by a living 
wage ordinance, or (b) earn a wage higher than the proposed minimum wage 
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ordinance. We would expect those who will not benefit from a wage ordinance to 
reject it on grounds that it raises their costs without providing them with a benefit. 
Conversely, we would expect ordinance supporters to be those who would be 
covered by a living wage ordinance, or be those who make less than the proposed 
city-wide wage increase, which would be those who suffer from things like 
unemployment, low income, and low educational attainment (Card & Krueger, 
1994; Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2006).  
Additionally, James Buchanan’s theory of the fiscal gap suggests that 
citizens behave in exact opposition to what is presented by Clain (Buchanan, 
1999). According to Buchanan, a gap exists in the minds of voters. Rather than 
thinking of taxes and expenditures simultaneously, the decision process is isolated 
for each. He explains this by arguing that citizens frequently vote in favor of 
receiving increased government benefits, while simultaneously voting against the 
very tax proposals that would fund those benefits (Buchanan, 1999). When applied 
to the literature on minimum wage, Buchanan’s idea contradicts Clain by positing 
that citizens don’t actually consider the costs of minimum wage ordinances at all, 
and if even if they did, they would vote against any policy that raises their costs. 
Despite the abovementioned contradictions to Clain’s work, it is still a 
valuable contribution to the determinants literature in that it suggests more 
testing is necessary to better understand the influence of economic characteristics 
on the likelihood of policy adoption. Each study in the determinants literature 
finds that the economic characteristics of a city are variables of significance, 
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although for varying reasons. As such, this study retests these variables utilizing 
the theories that have garnered the most widespread support in the determinants 
literature: that wage ordinances are most likely to be enacted following periods of 
economic downturn. Retesting this theory furthers our understanding of how 
economic city characteristics may influence the passage of minimum wage 
ordinances.  
In accordance with the prior literature, I measure the economic 
characteristics of each city by analyzing unemployment rates, the percent of the 
population who are minorities, the percent of the population who fall below the 
poverty level, the percent of the population with a high school education and the 
percent with a bachelor’s degree (Clain, 2012; Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 
2001, 2006). Additionally, I add a measure of population growth to determine the 
economic attractiveness of the city. More information on these measures can be 
found in the data and methodology portion of this study. 
Interest Group Power 
Early studies on the determinants of living wage ordinances found the 
presence of interest groups to be a significant variable of interest, and concluded 
that interest groups are a primary source of diffusion for living wage ordinances 
across the country (Martin, 2001, 2006). There are a myriad of interest groups that 
could influence the passage of wage ordinances, however, interest groups would 
need to be uniform across all cities for comprehensive analysis. Due to the diverse 
10 
 
nature of interest groups, studies on the determinants of wage ordinances have 
largely only been able to focus on two types of interest groups: the presence of 
labor unions and the presence of chapters of the Association of Community 
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN; Clain, 2012; Martin, 2006).  
Unions possess significant collective bargaining power as interest groups, 
and use that power to influence policy changes to the benefit of their members 
(Doussard & Gamal, 2015). Additionally, unions are uniquely capable of engaging a 
wide number of voters directly through their membership, which better enables 
them to garner public support and influence political decisions (Green, Gerber, & 
Nickerson, 2003). Labor unions typically work to secure higher wages for their 
members and as a result have been observed to support living wage ordinances 
and use their membership to lobby in favor of those ordinances (Clain, 2012; Levin-
Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2001, 2006). Because of this, cities with an increased 
percentage of union members are expected to face an increased odds of enacting 
minimum wage legislation. This variable is similar to political ideology in the fact 
that union members tend to be liberal voters, but it is a unique measure of interest 
group power as well. 
Early studies on the determinants of wage legislation found that the 
presence of an ACORN chapter increased the likelihood that cities would adopt 
wage ordinances (Martin, 2001, 2006). ACORN was thought to be significant for 
the same reasons that union density was significant—it was a liberally oriented 
interest group. Additionally, it was a relatively easy interest group to observe 
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across municipalities due to its uniformity as a national network of local chapters. 
This is no longer the case, however, because the organization collapsed after an 
embezzlement scandal in 2010 (Smith, 2010). Consequently, studies taking place 
after the collapse of ACORN were no longer able to use this measure of 
community action organizations (Clain, 2012).  
Other interest groups may be worth analyzing in future determinants 
studies so long as they are consistent across each observed city. In many instances, 
however, analyzing the influence of these organizations may be inappropriate 
predictors for enactment due to their endogenous relationship with population 
size and ideology (Clain, 2012). That is not to say that there are no other interest 
groups that could be included in future determinants research so long as there is a 
clear theory linking the interest group to the outcome of interest, and so long as 
the interest group is uniformly present across all cities. Coincidentally, one interest 
group fits this description and has not yet been introduced to the study of 
minimum wage ordinances: younger generations. 
The Young and The Crisis of Democracy 
Age has been found to be a significant predictor of political activity 
(Campbell, 2003). Senior citizens, for example, under the banner of the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), are considered one of the largest and most 
effective interest groups in the country (Campbell, 2002). No rational politician 
would consider cutting social security benefits due to the expected outcry from the 
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AARP. Simply put, policy makers are receptive to increased voter participation, 
and when specific groups increase their participation, they are more likely to see 
their preferred policies enacted (Campbell, 2003; Griffin & Newman, 2005). 
Despite age playing such a large role in other political issues, however, studies on 
the determinants of wage ordinances have yet to consider age as a primary variable 
of interest. 
 The age groups within municipal populations have been considered as 
secondary variables of interest in some determinants research, and in fact, limited 
evidence suggests that cities with increased numbers of younger populations are 
more likely to adopt minimum wage ordinances (Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008). 
These studies, however, give no theoretical background for the inclusion of the age 
variable and also present conflicting evidence by suggesting that cities with large 
numbers of elderly populations are more likely to enact living wage ordinances 
(Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008). These conflicting findings and the overall lack of 
theory resulted in the variable of age being dropped from consequent studies 
(Clain, 2012; Doussard & Gamal, 2015; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Whitaker et al., 2012). A 
theory for the inclusion of an age variable, however, can be found using a public 
choice framework and the crisis of democracy literature (Clain, 2012; Dalton, 2016).  
First and foremost, young people have more to gain from municipal 
minimum wage ordinances than their older counterparts. They have less work 
experience and fewer years of education, which limits their earning potential and 
makes them more susceptible to unemployment (Mincer, 1974; U.S. Bureau of 
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Labor Statistics, 2013). Additionally, young people frequently work low-paying jobs 
while accruing significant amounts of student loan debt, the average of which is 
approximately $27,000 for a bachelor’s degree (Gorman, 2015). Based on these 
significant financial hurdles, I expect young citizens to be more favorable of 
minimum wage ordinances simply because they promise higher wages. While 
there is little conclusive evidence that minimum wage laws actually produce 
economic benefits (Adams & Neumark, 2004), the mere hope for higher wages is 
enough to spur young people to action. 
I analyze the influence of young citizens at the city level, by first assuming 
that all individuals are rationally self-interested (Mitchell, 1994). This is a central 
tenet of rational choice literature, which asserts that individuals consistently seek 
to maximize their personal benefits while minimizing costs (Buchanan, 1999; 
Shughart, 2008). A particularly poignant example of this characteristic and its 
political ramifications is found in a study that analyzed citizen’s preferences before 
the 2004 presidential election. The study surveyed citizens and found they favored 
electoral systems that promoted their preferred outcomes (Aldrich, Reifler, & 
Munger, 2014). In this instance, citizens sought to maximize their benefits by 
rigging the system in their favor, regardless of the costs imposed on those with 
alternative preferences. Therefore, based on the rationality of individuals, I expect 
that young voters at the local level will advocate for minimum wage ordinances 
regardless of any potential costs imposed on other groups. 
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An initial consideration of this theory may seem to contradict empirical 
evidence on voter turnout and political activity, which indicates that voter turnout 
is extraordinarily low at the local level, and young voters, in particular, are largely 
absent from the political arena (Dalton, 2016, pp. 64-65). I argue, however, that 
young voters matter for two reasons. First, even if it is true that young voters are 
largely absent from the political arena, they are rational and likely to mobilize 
when the benefits of action are high. In this case, youth populations are likely to 
advocate for minimum wage ordinances at the city level, and very few of them 
actually need to mobilize in order to have an impact due to lower turnout overall. 
Therefore, young populations can be an influential interest group at the local level 
because there are fewer political participants overall and less competition. As a 
result, when there are larger number of young voters in a city, who are upset by 
low wages, they are better able to successfully lobby for minimum wage 
ordinances. Fewer competitors in the formal political arena, however, is only a 
portion of the equation.  
The second portion of the equation that makes young populations matter 
stems from growing body of research in the crisis of democracy literature, which 
suggests that young people are actually very politically involved, but in ways that 
have not been previously considered by political commentators and researchers 
(Dalton, 2016). In Russell J. Dalton’s (2016) The Good Citizen: How a Younger 
Generation is Reshaping American Politics, he addresses the commonly held belief 
that American democracy is in trouble due to falling participation rates in younger 
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populations. While many political commentators disparage young Americans and 
blame them for their lack of participation, Dalton gives a more hopeful message 
and finds that not only are young Americans becoming more politically involved, 
but that younger generations across the world are becoming more politically 
involved, just in different ways than the generations that came before them 
(Dalton, 2016). Dalton’s contribution is one of a number of studies in both 
sociological and political literature that shows how norms of political behavior are 
changing across generations (Anduiza, Jensen, & Jorba, 2012; Dalton, 2013; Norris, 
2002; Stolle & Micheletti, 2013; Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli Carpini, 
2006).  
Social modernization has led to a change in generational citizenship norms 
over time (Dalton, 2016, p. 56). As outlined in Appendix A, American’s views of 
what makes a good citizen have transformed due to changing social conditions, 
such as rising levels of education and higher living standards. Older Americans, 
who grew up during different social conditions than their younger counterparts, 
tend to have duty-based norms of citizenship. They tend to view good citizens as 
those who do things like serve in the military, vote in elections, and respectfully 
defer to government officials. Younger Americans, on the other hand, are more 
likely to view themselves as good citizens if they are more engaged with their 
communities through things like protests, community service, and direct political 
action. These differences in citizenship values have been observed across 
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generations, and lead members of separate generations to act different politically 
(Dalton, 2016, p. 56-59; Norris, 2002; Zukin et al., 2006). 
According to Dalton, members of Generation X and Millennials are more 
likely to care for the social well-being of others, and this trait is expected to be 
even stronger among Millennials in particular (Dalton, 2016). Additionally, 
members of younger generations are more likely to promote active government 
policies than members of earlier generations such as the Baby Boomers (Dalton, 
2016). With this in mind, it is assumed that the Americans in Generation X and the 
millennial generation will be more likely to favor minimum wage ordinances 
because these policies are viewed as helpful for low earning people. Indeed, this 
may be part of the reason that minimum wage ordinances began diffusing in the 
first place during the early 1990’s, as members of generation x began reaching 
political age (Fry, 2018). However, no study on the determinants of municipal wage 
ordinances has sought to understand the impact of millennials now that they have 
reached political age. 
Based on these findings in the literature, I theorize that the presence of 
millennials is a significant predictor of municipal minimum wage ordinances 
because they are maximizing their preferences on two fronts. On the one hand, 
they generally stand to gain more from policy adoption and therefore can be 
expected to advocate for minimum wage ordinances in order to receive these 
perceived benefits. Additionally, however, millennials are more likely to favor 
minimum wage ordinances due to their predisposition towards having engaged 
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citizenship norms, which favor active government policies that promise to care for 
the less advantaged in society. This study therefore contributes to the 
determinants literature by examining the influence generational differences have 
on the adoption of municipal minimum wage ordinances in the United States, a 
phenomenon that has yet to be considered as a possible predictor of municipal 
minimum wage ordinances 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Most of the research on the determinants of municipal wage ordinances 
took place before millennials reached political age in 2016 (Clain, 2012; Levin-
Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2001, 2006) and the remaining study that could 
have captured at least part of the millennial influence do not test any age variables 
(Doussard & Gamal, 2015). This leaves a significant gap in our understanding of 
their influence, which is especially problematic considering the fact that 
millennials and post-millennials have rapidly bypassed previous generations in 
terms of population size, as observed in figure 2 (Dalton, 2016, pp. 10-13; Fry, 2018). 
As a result, this study analyzes the impact of younger generations by examining 
the 100 largest cities in the United States from 2012-2017. The 100 largest cities are 
the focus of this study because they provide the most updated and accurate data 
for observation at the city level, the data of which can be notoriously difficult to 
find. Additionally, the time frame for this study was selected because it provides 
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the most recent measurements available that capture the full influence of 
millennial voters.  
As determined by the data outlined in Appendix B, all members of the 
millennial generation have now reached political age as of 2016. This enables the 
study of their influence on minimum wage ordinances using 2010 census data, 
which also have not been utilized in any determinants research to date (Clain, 
2012). As such, generational composition is the primary variable of interest for this 
study and the influence of each generation will be compared against the other 
variables of interest presented in the determinants literature; namely, 
measurements of economic vitality and the presence of other interest groups and 
demographics.  
I consider two dependent variables across 10 different models, which are 
outlined in Figure 1. One dependent variable is categorical and measures whether 
or not a city enacts a minimum wage ordinance at any point from 2012 to the time 
of this study. The second dependent variable is continuous and measures the 
percent increase of minimum wages for cities that enacted them. In other words, 
my second dependent variable measures the effect of each independent variable 
on the magnitude of minimum wage increases across my sample. Data for these 
two variables were gathered from the National Employment Law Project (2016) 
and the UC Berkeley Labor Center’s (2019) inventory of local minimum wage 
ordinances, as were measurements of state minimum wage laws. Unless otherwise 
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stated, all remaining information on the specifics of each wage ordinance were 
gathered directly from city records. 
My principle model is a full logistic regression that measures 17 
independent variables against the dependent variable of whether a city enacts a 
minimum wage ordinance. This data set includes observations for 100 U.S. cities, 15 
of which enacted minimum wage ordinances. Due to this limited number of 
observations, and an even smaller set of cities within my sample that enacted 
minimum wage, I run three other logistic regressions that further divide my data 
into categories. Doing so enables an increase in the degrees of freedom present for 
analysis, and improves the accuracy of inferences from my results. These separate 
categories for these models are outlined in Figure 1 and are (a) economic variables, 
(b) demographic variables, and (c) generational variables, the last model of which 
will drop the measure of post-millennials as a means of comparison.  
In addition to the traditional logistic regression methods, I run a 
classification tree to better filter out possible interactions or collinearity between 
my variables. This is a nuanced approach to studying the predictors of minimum 
wage enactment that has yet to be implemented in the literature. Additionally, this 
method may improve the quality of my results while also improving their overall 
interpretability by presenting findings in a more intuitive graphic form. The results 
of this classification tree will therefore be compared to the results from each other 
model to look for and identify patterns in the data that can improve our overall 
understanding of the determinants of minimum wage ordinances. 
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To analyze my second dependent variable, the magnitude of wage change, I 
apply three linear regressions that incorporate the same variable categories as 
mentioned above. A detailed description of these categories can also be found in 
Figure 1. I use this method to bypass the limitations of linear regression, which 
cannot be completed if there are more predictors than there are observations. 
Fifteen of the cities within my sample enacted minimum wage ordinances between 
2012 to 2017, and there are a total of 17 independent variables in question. The large 
number of predictors and relatively low number of observations for analysis 
therefore requires the categorization of variables in order to determine any 
existing relationship between them and the magnitude of minimum wage 
increases in my sample of cities. 
In the final stage of my analysis, I will re-evaluate my models and findings 
to analyze the relationships between my most significant variables against both 
dependent variables. This will be done in the form of both a logistic and linear 
regression, which are highlighted in Figure 1. Doing this enables me to compare 
the significance of each finding deemed significant by prior models, thereby 
furthering an overall understanding of the predictors of minimum wage 
ordinances by identifying not only the significant variables, but identifying those 
who are most significant when compared to each other. This process is commonly 
used in studies of public health, and is applied as a means to add rigor to my 
findings. 
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Data used to identify the 100 largest cities by 2010 population and to obtain 
measurements of population growth were gathered from the City Mayors Statistics 
(2018) ranking of the 100 largest cities. Measurements for purchasing power were 
gathered using state-level regional pricing data provided by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (2019) within the U.S. Department of Commerce. Data on the 
percent of union members was gathered using state-level data provided by Hirsch, 
Macpherson, and Vroman’s (2001) dataset on union density by state. Data for city 
ideology was gathered from the American Ideology Project created by 
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013), with the exceptions of measurements for cities 
within Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Oregon. Missing ideological measures for 
these cities were gathered using state elections results for the November 2008 
presidential election (Kentucky State Board of Elections, 2019; Massachusetts 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 2019; Oregon Secretary of State, 2008; 
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2013). All other measurements were gathered from the 
American Fact Finder using 2010 Census data, including generational 
measurements which were gathered by collapsing age variables according to the 
generational measurements provided by the Pew Research Center (Fry, 2018; U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010). 
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Figure 1. All models and corresponding variables. 
My two primary hypotheses are outlined below. In addition to these, I have 
a secondary interest in a variety of relationships in accordance with prior 
literature. I expect that a decline in economic measurements will be associated 
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with increased odds of policy adoption. Similarly, I expect that an increase in the 
liberal ideology of a city and an increase in the density of union members will be 
associated with increased odds of policy adoption. In all, I expect to find that cities 
with low levels of per capita income, higher levels of poverty, lower levels of 
population growth, and higher unemployment will face increased odds for 
enacting minimum wage ordinances. Additionally, I expect that cities with larger 
populations of minorities, low levels of education, and a higher density of union 
members will face increased odds of policy adoption. I control for political 
ideology, state minimum wage laws, and purchasing power across all models. 
Table 1 
Primary Hypotheses for Minimum Wage Enactment 
Primary Null Hypothesis 
(Minimum Wage Enactment) 
An increased percentage of 
millennials in a municipality will not 
be associated with increased 
probability for policy adoption. 
Primary Alternative Hypothesis 
(Minimum Wage Enactment) 
Cities with an increased percentage of 
millennials will be associated with an 
increased probability for policy 
adoption. 
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Table 2 
Primary Null Hypotheses 
Primary Null Hypothesis 
(Magnitude of Wage Change) 
Of the cities that enact minimum 
wage ordinances, those with an 
increased percentage of millennials in 
a municipality will not be associated 
with an increased magnitude of wage 
change. 
Primary Alternative Hypothesis 
(Magnitude of Wage Change) 
Of the cities that enact minimum 
wage ordinances, those with an 
increased percentage of millennials 
will be associated with an increased 
magnitude of wage change. 
RESULTS 
Two of the initial regression models presented results that were statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence interval. These models included the general 
logistic regression with all variables, and the economic logistic regression. The 
general model found that each measure of education was significant, as well as the 
presence of the silent generation; while the economic logistic model found that 
ideology was a significant predictor. This information is outlined in figure six, 
which also highlights the significant variables found by the classification tree that 
include both measures of education, percent population growth, and the percent 
of union members. The figure also highlights the variables found to be significant
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at the 90% confidence interval because these variables were used to structure one 
last logistic regression to address the issue of multicollinearity. 
I use all variables that showed any level of statistical significance at or above 
the 90% confidence interval to create one final logistic regression. This practice is 
commonplace in public health studies seeking to explore the interplay between 
variables of any significance. These variables are noted in figure 6 along with the 
results of the final regression, which has been shaded red to improve overall 
interpretability. The results of this final logistic model reveal each measure of 
education to be statistically significant, as well as the median age of the population 
and the percent population growth. Interestingly, the silent generation lost 
significance under this model, which indicates its lesser importance for 
understanding the relationships in this sample of data, while the median age 
variable increased in significance. 
In addition to one final logistic regression, I use the same practice to create 
a final linear regression to measure the impact of my most significant variable (the 
percent of residents with bachelor’s degrees) on the magnitude of wage increases. 
To measure this, and because this linear regression was limited to 15 observations 
of cities that had enacted minimum wage increases, only the most significant 
variable found from the final logistic regression of statistically significant variables 
was included: the percent of residents with a bachelor’s degree. This maximizes 
degrees of freedom and makes best use of the small number of observations that 
actually enacted minimum wage ordinances. This regression, however, resulted in 
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no statistical significance despite the increased degrees of freedom provided by the 
model, but is shaded red in Figure 2 nonetheless. 
 
Figure 2. All models, variables, and relative significance. 
Appendix C displays the significant findings from the classification tree. 
The classification tree uses algorithmic statistical techniques that analyzed all 
independent variables to classify cities that enacted minimum wages from those 
that did not. It found that the percent of union members was the most significant 
variable, followed by the percent of residents with bachelor’s degrees and those 
with high school diplomas. The percent population growth of each city was also 
deemed significant, but to a lesser extent than all other variables.  
The classification tree analyzed all data and grouped them according to the 
branches on the tree. Therefore, by starting at the most significant variable, union 
percent, it is evident that 45 of the cities in my dataset did not enact minimum 
wage ordinances. The remaining cities that did enact city-wide minimum wage 
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ordinances had union percentages that were higher than 7.2%. Appendix D 
outlines how two branches of the tree interact with one another. As can be seen, 
the upper right category of the plot captures the majority of the cities that enacted 
minimum wage ordinances, and these cities held higher rates of union percent and 
the percent of residents with bachelor’s degrees. 
Table 3 
Classification Tree Predictive Accuracy 
Category Statistic 
Percent Correctly Classified 82% 
Specificity 94.12% 
Sensitivity 13.11% 
Area Under Curve (AUC) .77 
 
 
Figure 3. Confusion matrix for classification tree. 
Table 3 and Figure 3 above display the predictive accuracy and the 
confusion matrix for the classification tree, which indicate that the model fits my 
data well and correctly classified 82% of my data. The model does well to classify 
which cities do not enact minimum wage over those that do, however, there are 
some false negatives. Thirteen of the fifteen cities that enacted minimum wage 
28 
 
were misclassified. Despite the high number of false negatives as evidenced by the 
low sensitivity in Table 5, the model does show accurately that union membership 
and percent bachelor’s degrees are important.  
ANALYSIS 
This study was initiated under two assumptions based on theoretical 
contributions from the rational choice literature and literature on the crisis of 
democracy. In terms of the former, I initiated this study under the assumption that 
people are generally rationally-self-interested. As such, people can be expected to 
support public policies that maximize their benefits while minimizing their costs. 
Under this assumption, I anticipated finding that cities with higher youth 
populations would face an increased odds of enacting city-wide minimum wage 
ordinances, due to the fact that youth populations are more likely to work jobs 
that are at or below minimum wage rates. Similarly, I expected that cities with 
depressed economic characteristics would face higher odds of enacting minimum 
wage ordinances. 
While most of my economic measures, such as per capita income and 
unemployment, were not found to be statistically significant, I did find 
significance for population growth. According to my most rigorous logistic model, 
which included all variables with at least some significance, cities in my sample 
with a 1% increase in population growth were observed to face a 55% decrease in 
the odds for policy enactment. These results are displayed in Table 7 and suggest 
29 
 
that cities experiencing population growth are less likely to enact city-wide 
minimum wage ordinances. It is interesting, however, that my other economic 
measures were not found to be statistically significant. This could be due to 
multicollinearity (between population growth and the other economic measures) 
and my small sample size. Future studies, therefore, should consider the variable 
of population growth over a wider sample size to better discern its predictability.  
In terms of age, none of the generational variables were found to be 
statistically significant other than the presence of the silent generation, which lost 
significance in the later more rigorous models. The significance of the variable for 
median age, however, was determined to be significant and provides support for 
the rational-choice-based assumption that younger citizens are more likely to 
favor minimum wage ordinances. As is seen in Table 4, cities with a 1% increase in 
median age faced over a 45% decreased odds for enacting minimum wage 
ordinances. Although the impact of millennials in particular was not significant, 
taken altogether, it is evident that a higher concentration of younger individuals 
increases the odds of enacting municipal minimum wage ordinances. This is likely 
due to their perceived gains from policy enactment because their older 
counterparts generally work higher paying jobs. Additionally, however, this finding 
also provides support for my second assumption that cities with larger populations 
of youthful citizens face increased odds of enacting city-wide minimum wage 
ordinances. 
 
30 
 
The finding that cities with lower median ages face increased odds of policy 
adoption is congruent with the crisis of democracy literature, which suggests that 
younger citizens have different norms of citizenship than their older counterparts. 
According to Dalton (2016), younger citizens (and millennials in particular) are 
more likely to favor active government policies that attempt to care for the less 
fortunate. While I find no support in my final models for the assertion that 
millennials have any measurable effect (or any generation for that matter), I do 
find limited evidence supporting these claims through the significance of the 
median age variable. This suggests that younger populations do have a measurable 
impact on the odds of policy adoption for the cities in my sample, and suggests 
that future studies should include measures of age in their analysis. 
It is also important to note that median age variable is perhaps the best 
measurement of age demographics considering the presence of multicollinearity 
among my generational variables, which naturally add up to one in the population. 
While I did attempt to control for this by dropping the post millennial generation, 
the multicollinearity could be manifesting itself nonetheless, which suggests that 
the variable may yield different results in future studies over a larger sample size.  
My final and most significant set of findings concern my educational 
measures, although they do present an interesting puzzle. My results suggest that 
cities with lower numbers of high school graduates are more likely to enact 
minimum wage ordinances. At the same time, I find that cities with a 1% increase 
in residents with bachelor’s degrees face increased odds of policy adoption by 24%. 
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What could be happening between these two groups? Why would people on both 
ends of the educational spectrum support minimum wage ordinances? It makes 
sense for those without high school diplomas to support minimum wage 
ordinances because they stand to gain more in higher wages. We would expect 
those with bachelor’s degrees, however, to either be indifferent towards or against 
minimum wage ordinances if we only use a rational-choice framework.  
If we solely use a rational-choice framework to analyze the predictors of 
minimum wage ordinances, the influence of those with bachelor’s degrees is 
surprising. After all, if these people favor enacting a minimum wage, then they are 
supporting a policy that provides others with benefits while potentially imposing 
costs on themselves. Augmenting this view with the literature on engaged 
citizenship, and considering the significance of the median age variable, however, 
suggests that young voters are maximizing their preferences on two fronts. On the 
one hand, young citizens without high school degrees are influencing the passage 
of minimum wage ordinances because they stand to gain economically. On the 
other hand, young citizens with bachelor’s degrees are influencing the passage of 
minimum wage ordinances based on their preferences for active government 
policies that seek to care for the less fortunate. 
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Table 4 
Significant Findings 
Variable Odds 
Ratio 
95% CI Percent 95% CI 
2.5% 97.5% 2.5% 97.5% 
% Bachelor’s 1.246 1.103 1.407 24% inc 10.3% inc 40.7% inc 
% High School .844 .705 .994 15.6% dec 29.5% dec .6% dec 
Median Age .544 .336 .880 45.6% dec 66.4% dec 12% dec 
% Pop Growth .448 .255 .789 55.2% dec 74.5% dec 21.1% dec 
 
Lastly, as expected, political ideology remains a significant predictor of 
policy adoption as is the density of union membership. This is consistent with 
prior determinants research and explained by the fact that minimum wage 
ordinances are liberal policies and the sole purpose of unions is to improve the 
wages and conditions for their workers. 
The 15 cities that adopted minimum wage ordinances share little else of 
significance in common other than the findings mentioned above. As previously 
stated in the literature, “no two [ordinances] are the same” (Bernstein, 2004, p. 
100). This variation is evident among this sample through the fact that some cities 
include both a minimum wage and a subminimum wage for tipped employees, 
while some include incentives for healthcare coverage, the use of local consumer 
price indexes as opposed to regional or nation, or the use of different phases of 
wage increases. That being said, it is noteworthy that nine of the 15 cities are 
located in the western United States, and the majority of those (six) are found 
within the state of California. 
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Table 5 
Cities That Enacted Minimum Wage Ordinances 
Number City 
1 Albuquerque, New Mexico 
2 Chicago, Illinois 
3 Kansas City, Missouri 
4 Lexington-Fayette, Kentucky 
5 Los Angeles, California 
6 Louisville, Kentucky 
7 Oakland, California 
8 Portland, Oregon 
9 Sacramento, California 
10 San Diego, California 
11 San Francisco, California 
12 San Jose, California 
13 Seattle, Washington 
14 St. Louis, Missouri 
15 Washington, DC 
CONCLUSION 
 I find no evidence to support my hypothesis that an increased percentage of 
millennials in a municipality will be associated with increased odds for policy 
adoption. Similarly, I find no evidence to support my hypothesis that cities with an 
increased percentage of millennials will be associated with an increased magnitude 
of minimum wage changes. As a result, I fail to reject each of my primary null 
hypotheses regarding the impact of millennial voters. Interestingly, however, my 
results indicate that the age composition within city populations may still be a 
significant predictor of minimum wage ordinances. Cities with a lower median age 
were observed to face an increased likelihood for enacting minimum wage 
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ordinances. This finding suggests that future studies of the determinants of 
minimum wage ordinances should consider age as a possible predictor. 
 In terms of my secondary variables of interest, I find evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that cities are more likely to enact minimum wage ordinances 
following periods of economic downturn, or at least during periods of declining 
economic growth. This contributes to our understanding of minimum wage 
ordinances by finding support for the original economic theories presented in the 
determinants literature, rather than the theory advanced by Clain (2012), which 
posited the opposite relationship. My most significant findings, however, suggest 
that minimum wage ordinances are more likely to be enacted among cities with 
higher rates of bachelor’s degrees. Perhaps then, considering the ever-growing 
number of bachelor’s degrees being awarded throughout the United States, the 
incidence of cities enacting minimum wage ordinances will continue its upward 
trajectory. 
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Appendix A 
The Changing American Public 
 
 Note. From The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American 
Politics (2nd ed, p. 5), by R. J. Dalton, 2016, Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Copyright © 2016 by CQ Press. Reprinted with permission.  
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Appendix B 
Births Underlying Each Generation 
 
 
Note. From “Millennials Projected to Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest 
Generation,” by R. Fry, 2016, Pew Research Center (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/03/01/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers). Reprinted with permission. 
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Appendix C 
Classification Tree Findings 
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Appendix D 
Correlation Scatter Plot for Classification Tree 
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Appendix E 
Additional Tables 
Table 6 
 
Full Logistic Regression Model Parameter Estimates 
Coefficient Estimate SE z-value Sig. Level 
Intercept -1.741e+01 8.227e+01 -0.212 0.8324 
Percent White -1.741e+01 8.227e+01 -0.212 0.8324 
Purchasing Power -1.055e-01 9.971e-02 -1.058 0.2902 
Percent Below Poverty Level 3.376e+01 1.844e+01 -1.831 0.0671 
Percent Population Growth 6.646e+01 4.033e+01 -1.648 0.0994 
State Minimum Wage Higher 2.856e+00 1.784e+00  1.601 0.1094 
Union Percent  1.762e+00 1.118e+01  0.158 0.8748 
Unemployment Rate 2.953e+01 3.066e+01  0.963 0.3355 
Per Capita Income 4.283e-05 1.233e-04  0.347 0.7284 
Percent Bachelor’s 2.578e+01 1.159e+01  2.225 0.0261 
Percent High School -3.105e+01 1.506e+01 -2.062 0.0392 
Percent Democrat 5.995e+00 4.489e+00 1.336 0.1817 
Post Millennial 6.434e+01 7.725e+01 0.833 0.4049 
Millennial 5.853e+01 8.229e+01 0.711 0.4769 
Generation X 1.112e+02 7.340e+01 1.515 0.1298 
Boomers 1.732e+02 1.129e+02 1.534 0.1249 
Silent 2.788e+02 1.191e+02 2.342 0.0192 
Median Age 2.331e+00 1.317e+00 -1.769 0.0768 
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Table 7 
 
Full Logistic Regression Odds Ratios 
Coefficient Odds Lower 95% 
CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Percent White 1.00036341 0.999476151 1.0012515 
Purchasing Power 0.89989747 0.740142913 1.0941339 
Percent Below Poverty Level 0.71344575 0.497049876 1.0240518 
Percent Population Growth 0.51448199 0.233396726 1.1340850 
State Minimum Wage Higher 17.38590806 0.527217308 573.3305685 
Union Percent  1.01777595 0.817473175 1.2671583 
Unemployment Rate 1.34357042 0.736656427 2.4505066 
Per Capita Income 1.00004283 0.999801081 1.0002846 
Percent Bachelor’s 1.29404910 1.031141741 1.6239892 
Percent High School 0.73310986 0.545779575 0.9847383 
Percent Democrat 1.06178520 0.972360040 1.1594345 
Post Millennial 1.90294676 0.418676077 8.6491838 
Millennial 1.79550449 0.357873976 9.0083006 
Generation X 3.04019962 0.721282803 12.8144102 
Silent 16.25050913 1.575217205 167.6461163 
Median Age 0.09722362 0.007354636 1.2852344 
 
Table 8 
 
Findings of Logistic Regression Using Only Significant Predictors 
Coefficient Estimate         SE z-value Sig. Level 
Intercept 24.2008 10.0517 2.408 0.016057 
Percent Bachelor’s 22.0066  6.2035 3.547 0.000389 
Percent High School -17.7773 8.7709 -2.027 0.042678 
Median Age -0.6092 0.2456 -2.481 0.013112 
Silent 65.2828 38.2911 1.705 0.088212 
Percent Below Poverty Level -11.9500  7.9045 -1.512 0.130588 
Percent Population Growth -80.2795 28.8373 -2.784 0.005371 
 
  
49 
 
Table 9 
 
Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Using Only Significant Predictors 
Coefficient Odds Lower 95  
% CI 
Upper 95 
% CI 
Percent Bachelor’s 1.2461586 1.1034924 1.4072696 
Percent High School 0.8371323 0.7049138 0.9941506 
Median Age 0.5437650 0.3360205 0.8799474 
Silent 1.9209659 0.9069538 4.0686856 
Percent Below Poverty Level 0.8873644 0.7600087 1.0360612 
Percent Population Growth 0.4480749 0.2546169 0.7885224 
 
Table 10 
 
Results from Economic Logistic Regression 
Coefficient Estimate SE z-value Sig. Level 
Intercept -4.831e+00 4.253e+00 -1.136 0.2560 
Percent Population Growth -2.302e+01 2.323e+01 -0.991 0.3219 
Unemployment Rate -1.074e+01 1.810e+01 -0.593 0.5530 
Per Capita Income 6.593e-05 4.078e-05 1.617 0.1059 
Percent Below Poverty Level -3.218e+00 9.637e+00 -0.334 0.7384 
Percent Democrat 1.406e+00 9.207e-01  1.527 0.1267 
Percent Population Growth 5.271e+00 2.679e+00 1.968 0.0491 
Purchasing Power -1.250e-02 4.121e-02 -0.303 0.7616 
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Table 11 
 
Odds Ratios from Economic Logistic Regression 
Coefficient Odds Lower 95  
% CI 
Upper 95 
% CI 
Percent Democrat 5.271081 0.02103985 10.52112 
 
Table 12 
 
Results from Demographic Logistic Regression 
Coefficient Estimate SE z-value Sig. Level 
Intercept -3.82249 10.68761 -0.358 0.7206 
Percent White 0.01993 0.02547 0.782 0.43 
Purchasing Power -0.01129 0.05771 -0.196 0.8449 
Union Percent 11.82220 7.79251 1.517 0.1292 
Percent Bachelor’s 7.75891 4.70922 1.648 0.0994 
Percent High School -4.88545 8.19719 -0.596 0.5512 
Percent Democrat 3.17473 2.63450 1.205 0.2282 
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Table 13 
 
Results from Generational Logistic Regression Model 
Coefficient Estimate        SE z-value Sig. Level 
Intercept -3.82249 10.68761 -0.358 0.7206 
Post Millennial -49.877489 46.461357 -1.074 0.2830 
Millennial -46.682864 53.102219 -0.879 0.3793 
Generation X -6.492547 26.877004 -0.242 0.8091 
Boomers -10.412327 47.222432 -0.220 0.8255 
Median Age -0.770801 0.756616 -1.019 0.3083 
State Minimum Wage Higher 1.386005 0.886232 1.564 0.1178 
Percent Democrat 3.569924 2.162605 1.651 0.0988 
Purchasing Power 0.008024 0.035798 0.224 0.8226 
 
Table 14 
 
Linear Regression with Percent Bachelor’s Degree 
Coefficient Estimate        SE z-value Sig. Level 
Intercept 0.1430 0.1920 0.745 0.470 
Percent Bachelor’s Degree 0.7417 0.4818 1.539 0.148 
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Table 15 
 
Generational Linear Regression 
Coefficient Estimate        SE t-value Sig. Level 
Intercept -0.8687999 2.9837996 -0.291 0.781 
Millennial 2.8089329 4.5370659 0.619 0.559 
Generation X 7.2538879 6.2944663 1.152 0.293 
Boomers 12.0843674 17.2022801 0.702 0.509 
Silent 9.5331357 8.7275185 1.092 0.317 
Median Age -0.1600033 0.1895902 -0.844 0.431 
State Minimum Wage Higher 0.2097140 0.3012912 0.696 0.512 
Percent Democrat 0.5295540 0.5192495 1.020 0.347 
Purchasing Power -0.0007475 0.0077823 -0.096 0.927 
 
Table 16 
 
Economic Linear Regression 
Coefficient Estimate        SE t-value Sig. Level 
Intercept 1.125e-02 6.646e-01 0.017 0.987 
Purchasing Power -1.008e-02 7.341e-03 -1.373 0.212 
Percent Below Poverty Level 2.746   2.358 1.164 0.282 
Percent Population Growth .960 5.752 1.732 0.127 
State Minimum Wage Higher 1.396e-01 1.751e-01 0.797 0.451 
Unemployment Rate 1.443 3.977 0.363 0.727 
Per Capita Income 8.503e-06 9.938e-06 0.856 0.421 
Percent Democrat 2.992e-01 4.626e-01 0.647 0.53 
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Table 17 
 
Demographic Linear Regression 
Coefficient Estimate         SE t-value Sig. Level 
Intercept 3.334519 2.114140 1.577 0.1534 
Percent White -0.010668 0.005594 -1.907 0.0930 
Purchasing Power -0.013870 0.008695 -1.595 0.1493 
Union Percent -0.453817 1.424129 -0.319 0.7581 
Percent Bachelor’s 2.434982 1.070743 2.274 0.0526 
Percent High School -1.770618 1.901137 -0.931 0.3789 
Percent Democrat -0.326040  0.491914 -0.663 0.5261 
 
